Report for IP: 34.52.150.124

This IP requested common backup file paths (.bak, .sql, .zip, wp-config.bak), hunting for database dumps or config files containing plaintext credentials. A single exposed wp-config.bak can hand an attacker full database access. This attack is automated and deliberate.

This IP generated over 20 HTTP 4xx errors in 60 seconds using a User-Agent identified as a bad bot (scraper, headless browser, or attack proxy). The high error rate indicates automated probing for vulnerabilities while trying to appear as generic traffic. Legitimate services respect robots.txt and do not flood servers with errors.

This IP rapidly probed multiple non-existent PHP paths in under 60 seconds — a hallmark of automated webshell scanning tools hunting for previously uploaded backdoors or vulnerable file-upload endpoints. If successful, a webshell grants the attacker full remote code execution on the server.

This IP requested the /.git/ directory, attempting to download source code, commit history, database credentials, and API keys from an accidentally exposed Git repository. Automated tools can reconstruct an entire codebase from an exposed .git folder. No legitimate client ever requests this path.

This IP requested a root-level project or infrastructure file — docker-compose.yml, a Terraform state file, package.json, or a generic config/secrets.json — hunting for source code, deployment secrets, or infrastructure details accidentally left reachable over HTTP. No legitimate web visitor needs these.

This IP requested a .env file (or a variant like .env.local, .env.production) — files that commonly contain database credentials, API keys, and other secrets for a web application. No legitimate visitor ever requests this path; it is exclusively probed by attackers hunting for leaked configuration.

This IP requested a dot-folder or file used by cloud CLIs, SSH, or AI coding tools to store credentials — AWS/GCP/Azure config, SSH private keys, .netrc, or a Claude/Codex/Cursor config folder. These never belong in a web root; a hit hands an attacker API keys or shell access outright. No legitimate visitor requests these paths.

This IP probed a debug or admin endpoint from a non-WordPress stack — Spring Boot's actuator, Go's pprof, Symfony's profiler, a Vite dev-server file read, or similar. None of these exist on a WordPress install; the request is a blind, automated sweep fingerprinting whatever stack happens to answer.